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LAWYERS, PLEASE CHECK YOUR FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AT THE BAR: THE PROBLEM
OF STATE-MANDATED BAR DUES AND COMPELLED
SPEECH*
[Tlo compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyran-
nical,'
In 1982, the president of the State Bar of California stood before that
organization's convention and scolded a United States Senate candidate and
other critics of the California Supreme Court.2 Candidate Pete Wilson had
urged voters to recall Chief Justice Rose Bird if the court overturned a
California ballot initiative known as the Victims' Bill of Rights.' Responding
to Wilson, California Bar president Anthony Murray contended that de-
tractors of the state's highest court were "trying to pull down our legal
system. ' 4 He rebuked "every unscrupulous politician" who sought to achieve
personal gain by abusing the judiciary.5 Suggestions of a recall of Bird,
said Murray, were "idiotic cries of the self-appointed vigilantes." ' 6
Although bar delegates followed Murray's lead by voting to reprimand
Wilson for "threatening" the court, 7 his speech and their resolution appar-
* The author thanks Dean Randall P. Bezanson and Notes & Comments Editor Georgia
M. Sullivan for their thoughtful suggestions and valuable advice.
1. An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, 1785 Va. Laws ch. 34, reprinted in 12
VA. STATS. AT LAR E 84, 85 (Hening 1823).
2. Anthony Murray, Independence of the Judiciary, Address Before the Annual Meeting
of the State Bar of California (Sept. 12, 1982), in 1 Joint App. at 20-22, Keller v. State Bar,
496 U.S. 1 (1990) (No. 88-1905); Harriet Chiang, State Bar to Talk Power This Weekend,
S.F. CtmoN., Aug. 24, 1990, at A5.
3. See Murray, supra note 2, at 22 (stating that "candidate for national office, himself
a lawyer," threatened to support recall of Chief Justice Rose Bird if court overturned Victims'
Bill of Rights); Chiang, supra note 2, at A5 (stating that bar president's speech criticized
Senate candidate Pete Wilson for threatening to take part in recall campaign against Bird). In
his speech to the California Bar, President Anthony Murray called the Victims' Bill of Rights
"a simplistic, almost childish, but extremely dangerous measure." Murray, supra note 2, at
24. The ballot initiative, which voters approved in June 1982, raised California's standard for
criminal insanity, banned plea bargaining in some felony cases, and allowed courts to admit
all "relevant evidence," including evidence gathered illegally. Robert W. Stewart, Van de
Kamp Hits Supreme Court's Delay on Key Issues, L.A. TrsEs, Jan. 10, 1985, at 3.
4. Murray, supra note 2, at 26; Philip Hager, High Court to Decide on State Bar
Limits, L.A. Tam.s, Aug. 29, 1986, at 29; Dan Morain, Court Restricts Involvement in Politics
By Bar, L.A. Tmms, May 24, 1986, at 1.
5. Murray, supra note 2, at 22.
6. Id.
7. Chiang, supra note 2, at A5; see also Exhibit C, I Joint App. at 13, Keller v. State
Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (No. 88-1905) (providing partial list of California Bar resolutions,
including resolution expressing disapproval of statements of senatorial candidate Pete Wilson
regarding court review of Victims' Bill of Rights).
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ently were of slight political consequence: voters ousted Bird in 1986,8 and
Wilson went on to become a United States senator 9 and, later, California's
governor.'0 But Murray's speech and the bar's resolution did have one
major effect: they prompted twenty-one lawyers to sue the California Bar."
The attorney-plaintiffs argued that the bar violated their First Amendment
rights by using lawyers' state-mandated bar dues12 to fund political activities,
such as the distribution of news releases and voter-educational materials
containing the text of Murray's speech. 3
The dissenting attorneys' case eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court as Keller v. State Bar,4 in which a unanimous Court found
for the attorney-plaintiffs. 5 The Court held that if a state demands that
lawyers who practice law within its borders pay dues to a state bar, that
organization may not use members' dues to pay for ideological activities
unrelated to the bar's purposes.' 6 Although a state may require its lawyers
to pay for programs germane to regulating the legal profession or to
improving legal services in the state, the state may not compel bar members
to fund unrelated political activities, such as support for gun-control laws
or a nuclear weapons freeze.'
7
Unfortunately, the distinction that the Keller Court made between
appropriate and inappropriate activities is not clear.' 8 The Keller Court
8. Chiang, supra note 2, at A5; Frank Clifford, Voters Repudiate Three of Court's
Liberal Justices, L.A. Tiars, Nov. 5, 1986, at 1.
9. See Keith Love, Liberals Hope for Revival in Toxics Issue, L.A. TInEs, Oct. 29,
1986, at 29 (noting that Pete Wilson defeated Edmund Brown, Jr. in 1982 United States
Senate election in California).
10. Bill Stall & Cathleen Decker, Wilson Wins, Moves Quickly to Build New Adminis-
tration, L.A. Tims, Nov. 8, 1990, at 1.
11. See Chiang, supra note 2, at A5 (quoting attorney for Keller plaintiffs as stating
that Murray's speech was "the straw that broke the camel's back" and prompted lawsuit
against bar).
12. See CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (stating that only
active members of California Bar may practice law in state); id. § 6126 (stating that holding
oneself out as entitled to practice law while suspended from state bar is criminal act); id.
§ 6143 (requiring suspension from membership in state bar of any member who fails to pay
membership fee); In re Johnson, 822 P.2d 1317, 1320 n.2 (Cal. 1992) (noting that practicing
law while suspended from bar is unlawful and constitutes contempt of court).
13. See Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1023, 1032 (Cal. 1989) (linking plaintiffs'
objections to Murray's speech to fact that bar publicized speech through news releases and
voter educational materials), rev'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Chiang, supra note
2, at A5 (quoting attorney for Keller plaintiffs as stating that speech by California Bar
President Anthony Murray was "straw that broke the camel's back" and prompted lawsuit
against bar). See generally Petitioner's Opening Brief at 24-25, Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S.
1 (1990) (No. 88-1905) (criticizing, inter alia, state bar's opposition to Victims' Bill of Rights).
14. 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
15. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 3, 4, 17 (1990) (holding that if state requires
lawyers to pay dues to bar, that organization may not use members' dues to fund ideological
activities unrelated to bar's purposes).
16. Id. at 13-14.
17. Id. at 13-16.
18. See id. at 15 (stating that where line falls between legitimate bar programs and
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attempted to balance lawyers' interests in freedom of speech and states'
interests in regulation of the legal profession and improvement of the judicial
system.' 9 That balancing of interests, however, failed to provide bars with
a clear way to distinguish their proper duties from illegitimate expenditures.
20
The Court relied in large measure upon its earlier opinions limiting expen-
ditures of labor union dues, 2' but the differences in purpose and function
between a bar and a union are too great for the rules governing one to
apply to the other.22 A better approach, which the Supreme Court applied
in Rust v. Sullivan3 and other free speech cases, asks whether a group's
political positions are traceable to its members. 24 Because a state bar's
speech is reasonably attributable to member lawyers,2 application of the
traceability standard in the bar association context would deny states the
power to compel lawyers to pay bar dues for any purpose other than
regulation of the legal profession. 26 By stopping short of such a strict
limitation on bar expenditures, the Keller opinion, though seemingly a First
Amendment victory, left unsettled the question of how bars may spend
lawyers' state-compelled dues. 27
activities having political or ideological coloration that is not reasonably related to advancement
of appropriate goals will not always be easy to discern); Chiang, supra note 2, at A5 (quoting
then president-elect of California Bar as stating that Keller opinion did not give bars any
bright lines).
19. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14 (stating that California's interest in regulating legal
profession and improving legal services in state justified coercion of California's lawyers);
infra notes 85-106 and accompanying text (comparing balancing of interests in Keller to
Supreme Court's balancing of interests in other compelled speech cases).
20. See Chiang, supra note 2, at AS (noting that Keller decision created confusion within
bar concerning standard for determining propriety of various bar activities); see also David F.
Addicks, Note, Renovating the Bar after Keller v. State Bar of California: A Proposal for
Strict Limits on Compulsory Fee Expenditure, 25 U.S.F. L. Rav. 681, 701 (1991) (calling
Keller standard for bar expenditures "quite fuzzy"); infra notes 107-41 and accompanying text
(discussing ambiguity of Keller standard).
21. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12-14, 17 (1990).
22. See Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1028 n.12 (Cal. 1989) (stating that bar's
situation is not analogous to that of labor union, which serves much more limited function
and constituency), rev'd, 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Norman L. Cantor, Forced Payments to Service
Institutions and Constitutional Interests in Ideological Non-Association, 36 RUTGERS L. REV.
3, 51 (1983) (citing bar's broad interests, which potentially include vast areas of legislative
activity); infra notes 107-19 and accompanying text (discussing differences between labor union
and bar association).
23. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). For discussion of this case, see infra notes 157-77 and
,accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 151-82 and accompanying text (explaining'constitutional significance
of traceability, or connection between organization's speech and members of that organization).
25. See infra notes 183-243 and accompanying text (applying traceablity analysis to
situation that lawyers face in states with integrated bars).
26. See infra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (advocating strict-limits on bar
expenditures of mandatory dues).
27. See infra notes 107-41 and accompanying text (discussing inherent ambiguity of Keller
opinion).
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I. THE PROBLEM: INTEGRATED BAR AssocIATIoNS AND COMPELLED SPEECH
An integrated, unified, or mandatory bar is an organization that a state
requires lawyers to join and to support financially as a condition of
practicing law in that state. 28 A lawyer is effectively unable to resign from
an integrated bar, because a lawyer who resigns loses the privilege to practice
law in that jurisdiction. 29
Courts have cited a variety of reasons for compelling lawyers to join
state-wide bars. According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, too many
lawyers refuse to join voluntary bars.3 0 Perhaps more meaningfully, the
Wisconsin court also found that members of the legal profession play an
important part in the judicial process.' The court concluded that an
independent, active, intelligent bar is necessary to the efficient administration
of justice. 2 Furthermore, according to the Wisconsin court, the general
public and legislators are entitled to know how the legal profession as a
whole stands on measures directly affecting the administration of justice
and the practice of law.3 An integrated bar, in the Wisconsin court's view,
can perform such functions far more effectively than a voluntary bar.
4
28. See In re Unification of N.H. Bar, 248 A.2d 709, 711 (N.H. 1968) (stating that
integrated bar is organization that state requires lawyers to join and to support financially as
condition of practicing law); DAYTON D. McKE", THE INTEGRATED BAR 25 (1963) (stating
that only features of integrated bar that distinguish it from voluntary bar are compulsory
membership and mandatory dues); Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., The Integrated Bar and the
Freedom ofNonassociation-Continuing Seige [sic], 63 NEB. L. Rav. 30, 30 n.1 (1983) (defining
integrated bar as official state organization to which all attorneys must belong and pay dues
as precondition to practicing law within that state); Comment, The Integrated Bar Association,
30 FoRDHAm L. REv. 477, 477 (1962) (defining integrated bar as official state organization
requiring membership and financial support of all attorneys admitted to practice in that
jurisdiction).
Although sharing some characteristics, unified bars vary considerably in function. For
example, integrated bars in North Carolina and West Virginia serve only to maintain an
attorney registry, to collect fees, and to perform certain regulatory tasks. Theodore J. Schneyer,
The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case, 1983
AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 1, 2 n.1. Presumably, then, concerns about a bar's political speech
would be less likely to arise in those states than in, for example, California, in which the
range of bar activities is considerably broader. See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text
(discussing activities of State Bar of California).
29. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (stating that
only active members of California Bar may practice law in state); id. § 6126 (stating that
holding oneself out as entitled to practice law while suspended from state bar is criminal act);
id. § 6143 (requiring suspension from membership in California Bar of any member who fails
to pay membership fee); In re Unified Bar, 530 P.2d 765, 765, 768 (Mont. 1975) (adopting as
part of state bar's constitution provision that nonpayment of bar association dues and
assessments shall result in suspension of right to practice law); In re Chapman, 509 A.2d 753,
756 (N.H. 1986) (stating that lawyer is not at liberty to resign from unified bar, because by
doing so lawyer loses privilege to practice law).
30. In re Integration of the Bar, 77 N.W.2d 602, 663 (Wis. 1956).
31. In re Integration of the Bar, 93 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Wis. 1958).
32. Id.
33. Lathrop v. Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404, 409 (Wis. 1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
34. Id.
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court also has stated reasons in support
of compulsory bar membership.35 Such a structure permits the imposition
of ethical standards on all lawyers and -provides an effective means for
enforcing those standards. 6 Additionally, according to the New Hampshire
court, a unified bar provides money and personnel to support continuing
legal education and to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. 37 In an
effort to achieve such goals, thirty states have integrated bars.3
Compulsory membership in a state bar is constitutionally significant
because, depending on how a bar spends members' dues, paying dues may
constitute speech.3 9 The Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amend-
ment protects contributions to an organization if the contributor's intention
35. In re Unification of N.H. Bar, 248 A.2d 709, 713 (N.H. 1968).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATON, 1992/1993 DIRECTORY 361-75 (1992) (listing state
bars). The ABA directory indicates that the following 30 states have unified bars: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. The bars of Puerto Rico and the
District of Columbia also are integrated. Id. at 363, 371. Three states (North Carolina, Virginia,
and West Virginia) and the District of Columbia have both integrated and voluntary bar
organizations. Id. at 363, 369, 373, 374; McKEAN, supra note 28, at 50.
In addition, some authorities name Arkansas and Minnesota as states with "partially
integrated" bars. JEFFREY A. PARNss, CiTATIONS'AND BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE UNIFIED BAR IN
THE UNITED STATES 4 (1973). Those states do not compel membership in a bar association per
se but do require lawyers to pay a registration fee to support regulatory programs. Schneyer,
supra note 28, at 3; see also MINN. SUP. CT. Ruins FOR REGISTRATION OF ATTORNEYS 3,
reprinted in 52 MINr. STAT. ANN. 586-87 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993) (requiring automatic
suspension of attorney who fails to pay annual registration fee); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 848 n.1 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that integration of
Arkansas Bar concerns only disciplinary matters); In re Procedures of the Ark. Sup. Ct.
Comm. Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law, 792 S.W.2d 323, 332 (Ark.
1990) (per curiam) (requiring suspension of attorney for failure to pay annual license fee); In
re Ark. Bar Ass'n, 687 S.W.2d 118, 124 (Ark. 1985) (same).
For further information on the nature of bars in particular jurisdictions, see Lathrop,
367 U.S. at 848 n.1 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (listing states with integrated
bars). See also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 808 n.14 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (listing states with integrated bars and citing related statutes, rules,
and decisions); MCKEAN, supra note 28, at 49 (listing states with integrated bars and methods
and dates of integration); PARN-ss, supra, at 3-4 (listing states with integrated bars and citing
related statutes and decisions); Steven Camp, Note, Arrow v. Dow: The Legacy of Lathrop-
State Bars Under Attack, 8 Oxi. CITY U. L. REV. 89, 118-20 (1983) (same); Peter A. Martin,
Comment, A Reassessment of Mandatory State Bar Membership in Light of Levine v.
Heffernan, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 144, 144 n.3 (1989) (listing states with integrated bars and dates
of integration); Jim Reynolds, Comment, Compulsory Bar Dues in Montana: Two (And a
Hall) Challenges, 39 Morr. L. Rav. 268, 290-93 (1978) (listing states with integrated bars and
citing related statutes and decisions); Comment, supra note 28, at 478 n.8 (same).
39. See Edward A. Tomlinson, Bar Unification-A Caveat, 26 MD. L. REv. 240, 245
(1966) (stating that legislative activities of unified bar may well interfere with dissenting
members' freedom of speech by requiring compelled affirmation of majority-held views).
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is to spread a particular message. 4° Such contributions enable like-minded
persons to pool their resources in an effort to further common goals.
4'
Because the First Amendment protects such activity, state action that limits
contributions implicates fundamental First Amendment interests. 42 State
action that compels such contributions-forcing persons to support an
organization's speech-can implicate similar interests. 43 Therefore, if an
integrated bar spends some portion of a member's dues on speech that the
40. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977). For further discussfon of
Abood, see infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
41. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (per curiam)).
42. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (per curiam).
43. Abood, 431 U.S. at 234; see also International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 776 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing dangers that state-compelled dues
pose to First Amendment rights). In Street, Justice Douglas advocated the following limitation
on the activities and expenditures of groups that state action constrains citizens to join:
If an association is compelled, the individual should not be forced to surrender any
matters of conscience, belief, or expression. He should be allowed to enter the group
with his own flag flying, whether it be religious, political, or philosophical; nothing
that the group does should deprive him of the privilege of preserving and expressing
his agreement, disagreement, or dissent, whether it coincides with the view of the
group, or conflicts with it in minor or major ways; and he should not be required
to finance the promotion of causes with which he disagrees.
Id. (Douglas, J., concurring). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black contended that a law
compelling someone to pay money to support political candidates or causes that person opposed
would differ only in degree, if at all, from a law compelling that person to speak for a
candidate, party, or cause he opposed. Id. at 788 (Black, J., dissenting). Black concluded that
the First Amendment deprives the government of all power to make any person pay any
money to support views that person is against. Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting).
In addition to Street, cases in which the Supreme Court has addressed the problem of
compelled speech include Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 74-75 (1990) (stating that
government generally may not base its employment decisions on political affiliation). See also
Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795-801 (1988) (declaring unconstitutional
state statute forcing professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors percentage of
charitable contributions that fundraiser actually turned over to charity during previous year);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 6, 20, 21 (1986) (holding
unconstitutional state agency's attempt to compel utility to publish third party's messages in
utility's newsletter); Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 (holding that compelling financial support for
collective bargaining activities has impact upon First Amendment interests, but that such
interference is constitutionally justified by legislative assessment of important contribution of
union shop to labor relations); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 717 (1977) (holding
unconstitutional state statute compelling motorists to display license plates with motto "Live
Free or Die"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25-29, 60-84 (1976) (upholding federal statutes
limiting campaign contributions and compelling disclosure of campaign financial records);
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243-45, 258 (1974) (holding uncon-
stitutional state statute forcing newspapers to give political candidates space in which to reply
to editorial criticism); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489, 496 (1961) (striking down state
constitution's provision that required public employees, as condition of state employment, to
declare belief in God); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 515, 528-29 (1958) (declaring
unconstitutional state requirement that in order to obtain tax exemption taxpayer must sign
oath pledging that he did not advocate overthrow of government); West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). (holding unconstitutional state school board's resolution
forcing students to participate in daily ceremonies honoring United States flag).
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member opposes, state action that compels payment of dues invades that
lawyer's First Amendment interests."
II. THE SUpIPMM COURT'S SOLUTION
Interference with First Amendment rights, however, does not necessarily
make a state's demand for bar dues unconstitutional, because government
at times can and does constitutionally abridge First Amendment freedoms.
4
1
The Supreme Court first considered whether bar integration is an acceptable
infringement on First Amendment rights in Lathrop v. Donohue.4 In
Lathrop, a Wisconsin lawyer objected to a state supreme court order
47
compelling all Wisconsin lawyers to pay dues to the state's bar.48 The
Lathrop Court found that state action compelling a lawyer to join a bar
did not violate the lawyer's right to freedom of association.4 9 A plurality
of justices, however, concluded that the Lathrop record provided an inad-
equate basis from which to answer free speech questions. 0 The Lathrop
44. See Falk v. State Bar, 342 N.W.2d 504, 513 (Mich. 1983) (Boyle, J., concurring)
(stating that bar's use of mandatory dues for lobbying effectively compels lawyer to speak
and thus impairs lawyer's First Amendment interests), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 469
U.S. 925 (1984); Tomlinson, supra note 39, at 246 (stating that lawyer suffers impairment of
his freedom of speech if integrated bar sponsors legislation or program that lawyer opposes).
In Falk, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected a lawyer's First Amendment challenge to
activities of that state's bar association but conceded that some of the Michigan Bar's practices
may have warranted closer scrutiny by the court. Falk, 342 N.W.2d at 504 (per curiam). Two
justices joined in a concurring opinion, finding that the bar's legislative and political activity
clearly involved a message. Id. at 513 (Boyle, J., concurring). Specifically,
[b]y rendering advice on content or supporting or opposing legislation, the bar
engages in expression. To the extent that plaintiff's mandatory dues are used to
support such activity, plaintiff is compelled to participate in such expression. Even
if plaintiff is opposed to the bar's position, or would choose to take no position at
all, he is forced to contribute to the advancement of the bar's position. His freedom
of conscience and intellect have been invaded .... Plaintiff has thus suffered some
cognizable First Amendment related injury.
Id. (Boyle, J., concurring).
45. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that
prohibition on encroachment of First Amendment protections is not absolute).
46. 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
47. In re Integration of the Bar, 93 N.W.2d 601 (Wis. 1958).
48. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 822 (1961) (plurality opinion). For further
discussion of Lathrop and various lower-court opinions on the subject of mandatory bar dues,
see Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Use of Compulsory Bar Association Dues or Fees for Activities
from Which Particular Members Dissent, 40 A.L.R.4m 672 (1985).
49. See Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843 (stating that Lathrop record did not reveal any
impingement upon protected rights of association); id. at 861 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating
that Wisconsin could constitutionally regard functions of integrated bar as sufficiently important
to justify any incursion on lawyers' individual freedoms).
50. Id. at 845. The Lathrop plurality opinion stated that the record before the Court
lacked information concerning the dissenting lawyer's views on issues the bar had addressed
publicly. Id. at 846. The record also did not reveal the way in which the bar exacted funds
from its members or used such funds for political activities. Id.
1993] 1839
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1833
Court therefore did not determine what restraints, if any, the First Amend-
ment Free Speech Clause imposes upon integrated bars.
5'
A. The Keller Opinion
A more complete record reached the Supreme Court in Keller.5 2 The
Keller plaintiffs, twenty-one California attorneys, objected to the bar's use
of their dues to fund political activities. 3 The California Supreme Court
found that the bar's support for the state supreme court 4 violated California
campaign laws. 55 More broadly, however, the California court rejected the
dissenting lawyers' constitutional objections to bar expenditures. 56 The at-
torney-plaintiffs appealed this portion of the California court's decision to
the United States Supreme Court, which found for the plaintiffs on free
speech grounds.
57
Adhering to Lathrop,5" the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, found that states could require lawyers to join and pay dues to
bar associations. 59 The Court then reached the issue that the Lathrop
plurality had not addressed: whether a state bar's use of mandatory dues
to finance political activities violates dissenters' free speech rights. 60 The
answer, according to the Keller Court, is that a bar can use compulsory
dues to regulate the legal profession or to improve legal services in the
state. 6' Such compulsion, the Court reasoned, is appropriate for the same
reason that unions can compel contributions to their collective bargaining
activities. 62 Just as employees benefit from union negotiations with man-
agement, lawyers benefit from a bar association's advice to the courts and
legislature on the policing of the legal profession.65 Consequently, benefi-
ciaries of such efforts should pay a fair share of the costs of those efforts.
4
However, a state cannot constitutionally require that lawyers pay for
every program that the bar might create. The justifications for compelled
association-the state's interests in regulating lawyers and improving the
legal system-limit the permissible extent of that compulsion. 65 An integrated
51. Tomlinson, supra note 39, at 244-45.
52. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
53. Id. at 5.
54. See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text (discussing bar president's speech and
bar resolution criticizing senatorial candidate for attacking state supreme court).
55. Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1033 (Cal. 1989), rev'd, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
56. See id. at 1030-31 (upholding bar's lobbying activities by broadly construing statute
defining California Bar's purpose).
57. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
58. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (plurality opinion).
59. Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Id. at 13-14 (citing Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 843).
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 13-14.
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bar must not use mandatory dues to fund ideological activities that fall
outside the bar's stated purposes.6
To illustrate the application of this standard for bar expenditures, the
Keller Court relied on Supreme Court cases concerning collective bargaining
agreements. 67 Such agreements may require employees of a particular com-
pany to join a union or to pay a service charge to a union.69 Compelled
speech problems arise in this context because employees might object to
union activities that collective bargaining agreements require them to support
as a condition of employment.
70
The Keller Court saw a substantial analogy between the relationship of
a union and its member-employees, on the one hand, and the relationship
of an integrated bar and its members on the other.7' Quoting at length
from Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, & Steamship Clerks,72 a
Supreme Court opinion concerning the union-employee relationship, 73 the
Keller Court stated that if nonunion employees object to being burdened
with particular union expenditures, a court should ask whether the chal-
66. Id. at 14.
67. Id. at 13-14 (citing Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S.
435, 448 (1984)).
68. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 742-44 (1961) (discussing
union shop agreement requiring railway employees to pay union dues as condition of employ-
ment); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 227 (1956) (stating that railroad
employees objected to union shop agreement that compelled them to join specified union or
to give up their employment).
69. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 212-13 (1977) (stating that
nonunion schoolteachers objected to new union's collective-bargaining agreement, which pro-
vided that teachers who did not join union had to pay union service charge).
70. See id. at 222 (stating that compelling employees to provide financial support for
collective bargaining representative has impact upon their First Amendment interests). Despite
the apparent lack of government action in a collective bargaining agreement between a union
and private-sector employer, compulsory membership provisions can raise First Amendment
concerns, beoause if an employer and union adopt their agreement pursuant to labor laws,
those laws are the source of authority by which employees suffer any loss of their rights.
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232. Furthermore, were a court to enforce an agreement, such enforcement
would be a further instance of state action in conflict with the First Amendment. Id. at 232
n.4.
71. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990).
72. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
73. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 438-40 (1984). In
Ellis, Western Airlines employees challenged a union's expenditures of fees that employees
paid to the union pursuant to a labor agreement. Id. at 439. Specifically, the workers objected
to use of their fees to satisfy union meeting, publishing, recruiting, and socializing costs, as
well as expenses the union incurred providing death benefits to employees and litigating matters
other than collective bargaining. Id. at 440. A district court granted the workers' motion for
summary judgment, finding that all the questioned activities were beyond the scope of the
union's spending authority. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 457. The Court reasoned
that compelling employees to help pay for the union's social events, conventions and publi-
cations constituted no infringement of the workers' First Amendment rights beyond the
infringement inherent in the formation of a union shop. Id. at 456. The Court therefore
upheld compulsory funding of those activities. Id. at 456-57.
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lenged expenditures are a necessary or reasonable part of the union's duties
as the employees' exclusive representative in labor-management issues. 74 A
union, acting pursuant to labor laws, may compel objecting employees to
share the costs of negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining
contract, of settling disputes, and of conducting other activities normally
or reasonably associated with a union's representation of employees. 75 A
union may engage in activities beyond the scope of collective bargaining,
but the union may not collect funds for such activities from employees
under threat of the loss of employment.
76
Applying the Ellis principles to the facts in Keller, the Supreme Court
concluded that the "guiding standard" for the constitutionality of bar
programs funded with state-mandated dues must be whether a bar necessarily
or reasonably incurs a particular expenditure for the purpose of regulating
the legal profession or improving legal services in the state. 77 In other words,
the relevant issue is not whether a particular bar activity might be political
or ideological, but rather whether that activity is germane to the state's
purpose for the compulsion.
7
The Keller Court concluded its opinion by referring bar associations to
Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson79 as a model to follow in limiting
expenditures of compulsory dues. 0 In Hudson,"' the Court concluded that
a union's funding procedures must entail minimal infringement on employ-
ees' First Amendment rights, and that employees must have a fair oppor-
tunity both to identify the impact of union expenditures on their interests
74. Keller, 496 U.S. at 14 (quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448).
75. Id.
76. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977).
77. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
78. See id. at 13-14 (stating that bar may use mandatory dues to fund activities germane
to professional regulation and improvement of legal services in state); id. at 14 (stating that
guiding standard for constitutionality of bar programs funded with mandatory dues must be
whether bar necessarily or reasonably incurs challenged expenditures for purpose of regulating
legal profession or improving quality of legal services in state).
79. 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
80. Keller, 496 U.S. at 17.
81. See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 (1986) (holding that
union's funding procedures must entail minimal infringement on employees' First Amendment
rights). Hudson concerned a labor agreement between a union and the Chicago Board of
Education. Id. at 295. The agreement required that the board deduct money from nonunion
employees' paychecks and pay that money to the union to cover collective bargaining expenses
incurred in the representation of nonunion employees. Id. A group of nonunion employees
objected to this assessment and alleged that the union was spending part of their salaries on
programs unrelated to collective bargaining. Id. at 297. A district court rejected their challenge
to the union's procedures, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed. Id. at 298-99. The Supreme Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit. Id. at 301. The
Court concluded that the union's safeguards allowing employees to appeal deductions from
their salaries were inadequate, because the procedures did not provide for a reasonably prompt
hearing of an employee's complaint before an impartial decisionmaker. Id. at 309: Furthermore,
the union did not provide employees with adequate information in advance of the deduction.
Id. Therefore, the Court concluded, the union's procedures were constitutionally flawed. Id.
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and to object to those expenditures.8 2 The union's procedures for collecting
an agency fee must include an adequate explanation for its basis, a reason-
ably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the fee before an
impartial decisionmaker, and an escrow account to contain amounts rea-
sonably in dispute while such challenges are pending. 3 Were an integrated
bar to adopt similar safeguards, the Court indicated, the bar's use of
compulsory dues would be constitutional.
8 4
B. The Keller Balancing Act
The Keller opinion, which balances the costs of state compulsion against
the benefits to those compelled," is consistent with prior Supreme Court
cases concerning compelled speech. Examining those cases as a whole, it is
difficult to discern a simple, bright-line test for the constitutionality of state
action that compels speech. 6 It is clear that the Supreme Court does not
consider strict scrutiny the appropriate test, because compelled speech cases,
have not prompted the Court to require a compelling state interest and the
least restrictive means of achieving that interest.87 Instead, the Court appears
82. Id. at 303.
83. Id. at 310.
84. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
85. See id. at 12 (stating that government may compel lawyers, who benefit from unique
status of admission to practice before state's courts, to pay "fair share" of costs of profession's
activities).
86. See Falk v. State Bar, 342 N.W.2d 504, 507-09 (Mich. 1983) (Boyle, J., concurring)
(summarizing United States Supreme Court cases concerning compelled speech and concluding
that Court has not stated clear test for validity of state action compelling expression), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925 (1984).
87. Id. at 509; see also RODNEY A. SmOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 179
(1992) (stating that strict scrutiny requires government to demonstrate that infringement of
fundamental rights is necessary to serve compelling ends and that infringement is narrowly
tailored to achieve those ends). The Supreme Court has applied a strict scrutiny analysis in
cases that include elements of compelled speech, but those cases were less about compelled
speech and- more about burdens on protected speech. David B. Gaebler, First Amendment
Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REv. 995,
996 n.4 (1982). For example, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974), the Court struck down a state statute forcing newspapers to give political candidates
newspaper space in which to reply to editorial criticism. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243, 258. The
Court reasoned that the statute inflicted a content-based penalty on newspapers and therefore
would chill protected speech. Id. at 256-58. The Court applied strict scrutiny, then, not so
much because the state had attempted to compel speech, but rather because the state had
burdened protected speech. Gaebler, supra, at 996 n.4. For similar applications of strict
scrutiny, see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 13, 19 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny and holding unconstitutional state's attempt to
compel utility to publish third party's messages in utility's newsletter, in part because forcing
utility to subsidize third party's speech would burden its own speech), and Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 355, 363 (1976) (plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny and finding that
government may not force public employee who supported one political party either to join
other party or to resign, because such state action would advance interests of party that
employee opposes to detriment of his own beliefs).
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to have endeavored to balance the weight of the individual interest at stake
against the magnitude of the government interest that prompted the com-
pulsion."8 In other words, the Court's analysis in compelled speech cases
seems to turn on whether the government's asserted interests outweigh the
individual's conflicting right to remain silent.8 9
For example, in Wooley v. Maynard,90 the Supreme Court struck down
a state law requiring motorists to display on their cars the state's license
plate with the motto, "Live Free or Die."'" Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the Wooley majority, cited West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette92 for the proposition that the First Amendment protects both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking. 9 The Court
acknowledged that the compulsion at issue in Barnette-mandatory partic-
ipation in the pledge of allegiance-constituted a more serious infringement
of personal liberties than did the license plate requirement to which Maynard
88. Falk, 342 N.W.2d at 509. In two cases central to this Note, the Supreme Court did
not apply strict scrutiny. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (stating that lawyers
benefit from bar's advice to courts and legislature and therefore should pay "fair share" of
costs involved); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (stating that
compelling employees to support collective bargaining has impact on their First Amendment
interests, but holding that importance of union shops to federal system of labor regulation
constitutionally justifies such interference). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit expressly rejected a district court's application of strict scrutiny in considering a
Wisconsin lawyer's challenge to bar integration. See Levine v. Heffernan, 864 F.2d 457, 461-
62 (7th Cir. 1988) (overruling district court's application of compelling state interest standard),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989). But see Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 (11th
Cir. 1986) (stating that strict scrutiny is appropriate analysis for all First Amendment chal-
lenges).
89. Falk, 342 N.W.2d at 510 (quoting Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1014).
90. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
91. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-17 (1977).
92. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, the Supreme Court
considered a board of education resolution requiring public school students to participate in
daily ceremonies honoring the United States flag. Id. at 626. The resolution included the
following words:
[The West Virginia Board of Education does hereby recognize and order that the
commonly accepted salute to the Flag of the United States [including the pledge of
allegiance] now becomes a regular part of the program of activities in the public
schools, supported in whole or in part by public funds.
Id. at 628 n.2. The resolution required that all teachers and pupils participate in the salute
and warned that refusal to participate would constitute insubordination. Id. A group of citizens
sought an injunction preventing enforcement of the resolution. Id. at 629. Specifically, the
plaintiffs argued that saluting the flag would violate their religious beliefs. Id. Acting on the
pleadings, a panel of federal judges forbade enforcement of the resolution. Id. at 630. The
Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 642.
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, declared that certain rights, including the right to
free speech, may not be submitted to a vote. Id. at 638. The government, Jackson acknowl-
edged, may foster national unity through persuasion and example. Id. at 640. But the state
may not constitutionally strive for national unity through compulsion. Id. at 640-41. Under
the Bill of Rights, the Court concluded, governmental authority does not control public
opinion; rather, public opinion controls authority. Id. at 641.
93. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714.
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objected.9 4 Even so, Barnette and Wooley presented the same problem: a
state's attempt to use its citizens as a means of fostering an ideological
viewpoint that some citizens rejected.95 Such compulsion, the Court stated,
is acceptable only if a countervailing state interest justifies the coercion.
9 6
New Hampshire asserted two interests in support of its law: easy identifi-
cation of vehicles and promotion of history, individualism, and state pride.9 7
The Supreme Court found that the state could meet the first interest without
requiring display of the state motto and noted that some New Hampshire
license plates did not carry the motto.98 The Court rejected the second
interest as ideologically loaded." The state's interest was in disseminating
an ideology, and that interest did not outweigh Maynard's First Amendment
right to avoid becoming a courier of the government's message.1 00
Similarly, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,'0' the Court con-
sidered whether the government may empower unions to compel financial
support for union activities if that compulsion interferes with First Amend-
94. Id. at 715.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 716 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 716-17 (noting that New Hampshire's interest in promoting appreciation
of history, individualism, and state pride was not ideologically neutral).
100. Id. at 717. The Supreme Court recognized a corporation's interest in freedom from
compelled speech in Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(plurality opinion). In Pacific, a public utility sought to avoid becoming a courier for a third
party's messages. Id. at 4. For 62 years, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Pacific) had published a
newsletter and distributed it along with utility bills to the company's customers. Id. at 5. In
1980, California's Public Utilities Commission decided that envelope space that Pacific used
to distribute its newsletter belonged, not to the company, but to its ratepayers. Id. The
Commission ordered Pacific to allow a group called Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN)
to use the envelope space both to raise funds and to communicate with ratepayers. Id. at 6.
TURN had been critical of Pacific's views and had opposed the utility in rate-making
proceedings. Id. at 13. Pacific appealed the Commission's decision to the California Supreme
Court, which declined to hear the case. Id. at 7. The United States Supreme Court overruled
the Commission's order. Id.
Justice Powell, writing for a majority of the Court, noted that corporations and associ-
ations, like individuals, are protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 8 (citing First Nat'l
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (nullifying state prohibition aimed at corporations'
attempts to influence outcome of state referendum) and Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 (1980) (invalidating state's efforts to prohibit political
discussion in utility's billing materials)). The comniission's order violated these protections by
taking space the utility had used for its literature and giving that space to TURN; in other
words, the commission's order effectively abridged the utility's speech in order to enhance its
opponents' speech. Id. at 5-6, 14 (citing Buckley v. Vaeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (per curiam)).
Furthermore, compelling Pacific to distribute TURN's notices would require the utility to
associate with speech it opposed. Id. at 15. Such consequences of state action, the Court
concluded, are unacceptable unless the state tailors its action narrowly to serve a compelling
state interest. Id. at 19. Because the commission could have achieved its stated goals through
other, less restrictive means, and because the chosen means burdened some points of view in
order to enhance others, those means were constitutionally unacceptable. Id. at 19-20.
101. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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ment rights.10 2 The short answer, the Abood opinion makes clear, is yes.'0 3
Although an employee might object to some union programs; although an
employee's moral or religious views on abortion, for example, might conflict
with the union's medical plan; and although financing the union might
interfere with an employee's freedom to refrain from associating with the
union's ideas, the Court concluded that such interference was constitution-
ally justified by the legislature's assessment of the importance of union
shops.104 In other words, the state's interest in smooth labor-management
relations outweighed the employees' rights to refrain from speaking. 05
The Keller Court took precisely the same balancing approach. The
Court did not discuss whether the state's interests were compelling, nor
whether the state's means of achieving those interests were narrowly tailored.
Rather, the Court simply found that California's interest in regulating the
legal profession and improving legal services in the state justified coercion
of California's lawyers.106 In other words, the state's interests outweighed
lawyers' rights to remain silent on those particular topics.
C. Keller's Problems
Although the Keller approach is consistent with precedent, it does not
provide lawyers and integrated bars a workable solution to this compelled
speech problem. One difficulty with the Keller opinion stems from its
102. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977) (stating that compelling
employees to provide financial support for collective bargaining has impact upon their First
Amendment interests). Louis Abood and other public school teachers objected to a collective
bargaining agreement between the school board and a recently certified union. Id. at 211-14.
That agreement required teachers who did not join the union to pay the union a service charge
equal to the regular dues of union members. Id. at 212. The school board would fire teachers
who did not pay the service charge. Id. After state courts held that the school board was
entitled to summary judgment, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial.
Id. at 214-16, 242.
103. See id. at 222 (stating that interference with teachers' rights is constitutional because
of legislature's assessment of importance of union shops).
104. Id. The Abood Court, in an opinion by Justice Stewart, explained its balancing of
interests. Id. at 220-22. The Court noted that designating a single collective bargaining
representative avoids the confusion that would follow from allowing two or more bargaining
units. Id. at 220. Also, having a single representative for all employees prevents potential
union rivalries and dissension in the work force. Id. at 220-21. Exclusive labor representation
also frees an employer from the possible threat of conflicting demands from different unions
and permits agreements that are not subject to attack from rival organizations. Id. at 221.
Furthermore, the duties of an exclusive collective bargaining representative entail great
responsibilities. Id. Negotiating agreements, administering them, and settling disputes can
require a great deal of time and money. Id. A union shop arrangement distributes the cost of
those activities fairly among beneficiaries. Id. at 221-22. Therefore, the Court concluded, the
government can compel individual employees to support the union's labor relations activities.
Id. at 222.
105. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455-56 (1984)
(citing Abood and other cases for proposition that governmental interest in industrial peace
justifies infringement upon dissenting employees' First Amendment rights).
106. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990).
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reliance on labor cases, which are not applicable in the integrated-bar
context. That the Court chose to compare labor unions to mandatory bars
was not surprising, because lower courts had used that analogy in deciding
similar cases. 07 However, despite the popularity of that analogy, the prob-
lems with it are manifest.
0 8
First, as the Keller opinion acknowledged, bar association activities do
not benefit lawyers as directly as union programs benefit employees.' 9 For
example, a bar does not negotiate with clients on behalf of its members,
as would a collective bargaining unit." 0 Certainly a bar's purposes are unlike
the reason for which Congress established collective bargaining: to preserve
industrial peace."'
A second problem with Keller's reliance on labor cases stems from the
fact that a labor union serves a much more limited function and constituency
than does a bar association." 2 The purpose of a bar is not limited to
promoting the self-interest of its members, but extends to improving the
administration of justice."' Therefore, a bar properly concerns itself with
legislation that affects society as a whole, not just laws that affect lawyers'
earnings and working conditions. "14 Even if a state bar narrows its expen-
ditures of compulsory dues to the activities Keller allowed,"' the group's
coffers nevertheless remain open to a vast number of expenditures. For
example, virtually any issue that comes before a state legislature is arguably
related to improving that state's legal services, because those services nec-
essarily include interpreting the state's laws." 6 Likewise, because the com-
petence of judges relates to the quality of legal services in the state, Keller
apparently would allow an integrated bar to engage in the very activities
that prompted the Keller lawsuit.17 In sum, because a bar has a much
107. See Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1028 (Cal. 1989) (listing opinions treating
integrated bar and labor union as similar), rev'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
108. See id. at 1030 (concluding that applying labor union test to bar would impose upon
bar massive burden of analyzing all proposed activities under vague and uncertain standards
designed for organizations of quite different purpose and structure -and probably would
discourage bar from carrying out statutory functions).
109. Keller, 496 U.S. at 12.
110. See id. (conceding that employees' benefits from union negotiations with management
are more direct than lawyers' benefits from bar activities).
111. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 880 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
112. Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1028 n.12 (Cal. 1989), rev'd on other grounds,
496 U.S. 1 (1990).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (stating that guiding standard for
propriety of bar expenditures must be whether bar necessarily or reasonably incurred challenged
expenditures for purpose of regulating legal profession or improving legal services in state).
116. See Arrow v. Dow, 544 F. Supp. 458, 462 (D. N.M. 1982) (stating that virtually any
issue before state legislature arguably is related to administration of justice or improvement
of legal system); Cantor, supra note 22, at 51 (stating that all legislation, by definition,
comprises part of legal system and therefore is of potential interest to lawyers).
117. See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text (discussing Pete Wilson's support for
1993] 184"7
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 50:1833
broader mission than a union, a bar's legitimate activities are far more
difficult to distinguish from unconstitutional expenditures than are a union's
legitimate activities."' Even the Keller opinion acknowledged that the dif-
ference between legitimate bar projects and forbidden ones would not always
be easy to discern." 9
The debate over senatorial candidate Pete Wilson's complaints about
the California Supreme Court 20 illustrates the difficulty of putting bar
programs into boxes.' 2' The Keller plaintiffs called bar president Anthony
Murray's speech criticizing Wilson an instance in which the California Bar
went beyond its proper role.2" Murray, however, found defense of the
courts an appropriate bar activity.'23 He characterized his remarks as "rhe-
torical" but "perfectly legitimate" and "not political."' 124
The problem is that both the Keller plaintiffs and the bar's president
are correct. The California Bar's charter empowers that organization to
promote the improvement of the administration of justice.2' As part of
recall of California Chief Justice Rose Bird and bar president's speech criticizing Wilson for
attacking court). Although the bar's criticism of a United States Senate candidate prompted
the Keller lawsuit, Chiang, supra note 2, at A5, that particular bar activity was not before
the United States Supreme Court in Keller, because the California Supreme Court had held
that distribution of the bar president's speech violated a distinct statute and rule governing
election expenditures. Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1031-32 (1989), .rev'd on other
grounds, 496 U.S. 1 (1990). Therefore, how the Court would have ruled on this aspect of the
dissenting attorneys' case is not certain. However, as noted in the text above, the performance
of a state's chief justice certainly would seem to be relevant to the task of improving legal
services in the state, which is among the bar activities that the Keller Court approved. Keller
v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
118. See Arrow, 544 F. Supp. at 462 (denying that advancing administration of justice
or improving legal system are bar's equivalent of collective bargaining activities). For further
analysis of the Arrow opinion, see Schneyer, supra note 28, at 60-62.
119. Keller, 496 U.S. at 15. The difficulty of distinguishing programs germane to the
administration of justice from political activities was not lost on the members of the Court at
oral argument in the Keller case. Justice Marshall, apparently frustrated at the inability of the
plaintiffs' lawyer to define those activities that were beyond the bar's legitimate functions,
asked the attorney: "What do you want us to say? Specifically. Words, please." Alexander
Wohl, California Bar Argues for Right to Lobby, S.F. CIHoN., Feb. 28, 1990, at A2.
120. See supra notes 2-13 and accompanying text (discussing Pete Wilson's support for
recall of California Chief Justice Rose Bird and bar resolution criticizing Wilson for "threat-
ening" court).
121. See Wohl, supra note 119, at A2 (recounting events at oral argument in Keller and
stating that justices tried with little success to determine which activities fall within bar's
charter). Oral argument in the Keller case included discussion of at least one specific topic of
bar speech. Id. Justice Scalia indicated a proposed ban on armor-piercing bullets, for which
the bar had lobbied, was eminently a political issue having very little to do with lawyers. Id.
But the lawyer for the California Bar responded that the proposed ban was relevant to the
bar's purposes because it related to California's definition of first-degree murder. Id.
122. See Chiang, supra note 2, at A5 (quoting attorney for Keller plaintiffs as stating
that Murray's speech was "the straw that broke the camel's back" and prompted lawsuit
against bar).
123. Murray, supra note 2, at 22.
124. Moran, supra note 4, at 1.
125. See Wohl, supra note 119, at A2 (quoting provision of California Bar's charter).
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that .task, the bar might well decide that its members have a duty to act as
defenders of the courts.126 Recognition of such a duty would be consistent
with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which urges lawyers
to defend the judiciary against unjust criticism.127 Furthermore, the general
public and legislators might benefit from learning how the legal profession
as a whole stands on measures directly affecting the administration of justice
and the practice of law. 12 Therefore, perhaps the bar should speak out in
support of the judiciary. 29 Such expression, related as it is to the functioning
of a state's courts, would seem to fall within the Keller safe harbor for
activities related to improving legal services in the state. 130
State action compelling lawyers to fund a bar's support for the judiciary,
however, could require lawyers who support one political candidate to
support the candidate's critics as well. Such compulsion, though possible
under Keller, would be unconstitutional, because support for a candidate
that an individual lawyer opposes fuithers that candidate's interests to the
detriment of the lawyer's own beliefs.'' Yet the Keller rule allows states to
compel lawyers to pay for a bar's speech, including speech those lawyers
oppose, provided that the bar's speech is germane to regulation of the legal
profession or improvement of legal services in the state.3 2
This constitutional flaw in the Keller limitation on bar expenditures has
created much confusion. In fact, the Keller opinion left lawyers flounder-
126. Murray, supra note 2, at 22.
127. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsimrrY EC 8-6 (1983) (stating that adjudicatory
officials, who are not wholly free to defend themselves, are entitled to bar's support against
unjust criticism), reprinted in STEPHEN GIaaas & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:
STATUTES AND STANDARDS 399-400 (1993).
128. Lathrop v. Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404, 409 (Wis. 1960), aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
129. See Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1031-32 (1989) (stating that bar may act to
promote independence of judiciary), rev'd on other grounds, 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
130. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
131. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (plurality opinion) (finding unconsti-
tutional policy of forcing state employee either to join political party in power or to resign
because, inter alia, support for party that employee opposes furthers that party's interests to
detriment of employee's own beliefs); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 790 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that First Amendment leaves government no
power to compel person to expend energy, time, or money to advance fortunes of candidates
he would like to see defeated or to urge ideologies and causes he believes would be hurtful to
country); cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (holding unconstitutional state agency's attempt to compel utility to publish third
party's messages in utility's newsletter because, inter alia, agency's order required utility to
use its property as vehicle for distribution of message with which it disagreed); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715-17 (1977) (holding that state interest in disseminating ideology
cannot outweigh individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming courier of government's
message that individual finds unacceptable).
132. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14 (stating that bar may use mandatory dues to fund
activities germane to professional regulation and improvement of legal services in state); id.
at 14 (stating that guiding standard for constitutionality of bar programs funded with mandatory
dues must be whether bar necessarily or reasonably incurred particular expenditure for purpose
of regulating legal profession or improving legal services in state).
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ing,13  because the Court did not provide integrated bars with a meaningful
way of determining whether a particular expenditure would be constitu-
tional. 34 The Keller opinion suggested procedures through which dissenting
lawyers might obtain refunds," 5 and Florida's integrated bar adopted a
comparable process. 36 Similarly, in response to Keller the California Bar
offered to cut dues for members who objected to the bar's political activ-
ities. 37 But neither Keller, nor Florida, nor California suggest solutions that
clearly define which bar activities are illegitimate. 31 Unless integrated bars
voluntarily abandon such ineffective remedies in favor of more meaningful
spending limitations, 39 or until the Supreme Court revisits the issue' 4° and
133. Chiang, supra note 2, at A5 (quoting member of California Bar's Board of Gover-
nors).
134. Id. (quoting then president-elect of California Bar as stating that Keller opinion did
not provide bright lines but instead left task of determining proper expenditures to bars).
Rather than risk crossing Keller's wavy line, the California Bar's president warned delegates
to the bar's 1990 convention to pursue only subjects permissible under Keller. Victoria Slind-
Flor, Contrast to Other Years: Bar, Bench Meet Quietly in California, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 10,
1990, at 3. Despite that note of caution, California Bar delegates in 1991 voted to support
surrogate parent contracts; that vote prompted yet another First Amendment lawsuit against
the California Bar. See William Carlsen, Two Lawyers Sue to Challenge Mandatory Membership
in Bar, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 18, 1992, at A13 (reporting that two lawyers filed suit in effort to
end mandatory membership in California Bar); Lily Dizon, Orange Lawyer Sues to Practice
Without Being Member of Bar, L.A. TnAs, Jan. 16, 1992, at B6 (same). For further discussion
of bars' reactions to the Keller decision, see Victoria Slind-Flor & Randall Samborn, Behind
the Big Questions, ABA Mulled Everyday Issues, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 4, 1991, at 10 (interviewing
Alaska, Florida, and Michigan bar officials).
135. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text (discussing Keller's reference to Chicago
Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), as illustration of refund procedures integrated
bar might adopt).
136. See Gibson v. Florida Bar, 906 F.2d 624, 628-29 (1lth Cir. 1990) (discussing procedure
through which member of Florida Bar could pursue refund of dues that bar spends unconsti-
tutionally). The Montana Supreme Court in 1983 ordered that state's bar to cease using
compulsory dues for lobbying until the bar developed a procedure whereby dissenting lawyers
could obtain a partial refund of their dues. Reynolds v. State Bar, 660 P.2d 581, 581 (Mont.
1983).
137. Gail D. Cox, Mad Money, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 10, 1990, at 6. The California Bar
offered to reduce dissenting members' annual dues by $3 per lawyer out of a total bill of
nearly $500 per lawyer. Id. At that rate, the refund plan "may just about pay for a beer,
over which each participating California lawyer can ruminate about justice." Id.
138. See Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rule 2-9.3 (Legislative Policies), 526 So. 2d 688,
689-90 (Fla. 1988) (adopting Florida Bar's refund procedure, which would deny dissenting
lawyer refund if challenged activities were acceptable under applicable constitutional law).
Although the Florida rule predates Keller, a court today presumably would read its reference
to applicable constitutional law as importing the nebulous Keller standard, which allows
integrated bars to spend compulsory dues on activities related to regulating the legal profession
or to improving legal services in their states. Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990).
139. See Slind-Flor & Samborn, supra note 134, at 10 (quoting Alaska bar official as
follows: "Our board is very careful regarding our mandate-discipline, admission and contin-
uing legal education-and we do not get involved in political matters").
140. The Court had an opportunity to revisit Keller and agreed to do so but later changed
its mind. Gibson v. Florida Bar, 906 F.2d 624 (lth Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305,
cert. dismissed, 112 S. Ct. 633 (1991) (stating that Court improvidently granted writ of
certiorari).
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replaces Keller with a clearer, more narrow standard, 14 lawyers in states
with integrated bars will continue to face the threat of state-compelled
support for political agendas they oppose.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
A. Specificity
The Keller opinion suggests, but backs away from, a possible solution
to the problem of distinguishing appropriate and inappropriate bar expen-
ditures: using mandatory bar dues solely to support programs at the clearly
legitimate end of the spectrum of bar activities. 42 Disciplining lawyers and'
proposing ethical codes are legitimate, nonpolitical expenditures of bar dues,
so bar members would have no valid constitutional objection to state action
compelling their financial support for such activities. 143 Furthermore, regu-
latory functions are clearly separable from more political bar activities.
44
Beyond that narrow zone of clear legitimacy, however, lie vast areas of
discourse that, as Keller acknowledges, may or may not include political
speech for which states cannot constitutionally compel financial support.1
4
1
Unless integrated bars limit their expenditures of compulsory dues to those
programs clearly related to regulation of the profession,' 46 third parties
inevitably will attribute a bar's speech to its individual members.
47
If integrated bars were to use mandatory dues to pay only for profes-
sional regulation, the primary function of integrated bars would be sharply
defined. 41 Consequently, a bar's political expenditures, funded purely with
donated money, would be relatively immune from First Amendment chal-
lenge. 149 Thus, narrowing the range of bars' expenditures of mandatory dues
141. See infra text accompanying notes 142-50 (arguing that First Amendment requires
integrated bars to spend funds derived from compulsory dues solely to regulate legal profession).
142. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1990) (stating that extreme ends of
spectrum of bar activities are clear, and indicating that disciplining members of bar and
proposing ethical codes are at clearly legitimate end of that spectrum).
143. Id. at 12, 16.
144. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 875 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
145. See Keller, 496 U.S. at 15 (stating that where line falls between legitimate and
illegitimate bar activities will not always be easy to discern, but acknowledging that extreme
ends of spectrum of bar activities are clear); Keller v. State Bar, 767 P.2d 1020, 1031 (Cal.
1989) (stating that bill-by-bill, case-by-case review of bar activities is unworkable), rev'd, 496
U.S. 1 (1990).
146. See Addicks, supra note 20, at 711-16 (advocating that California Bar read Keller
narrowly and limit expenditure of mandatory dues to regulating profession).
147. See infra notes 151-243 and accompanying text (explaining constitutional significance
of traceability, or connection between organization's speech and organization's members).
148. See Addicks, supra note 20, at 715-16 (advocating strict limitation on bar expenditures
as way to define function and responsibility of California Bar more sharply).
149. See id. (arguing that strict limits on bar expenditures would eliminate threat of First
Amendment challenges by dissenting lawyers).
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would eliminate any chilling effect that the possibility of lawsuits creates.5 0
Integrated bars, by funding their speech only with money that supporters
provided willingly, would be able to speak out on any issue without fear
of court challenges.
B. Traceability
Limiting expenditure of state-mandated bar dues to regulatory activities
is not only workable; such an approach also would be consistent with
analogous Supreme Court cases concerning compelled speech. Those cases
indicate that the "traceability," or directness, of the connection between a
government-coerced message and a particular individual is relevant in de-
ciding whether the coercion is constitutional.'5 '
For example, if the government forces an individual to recite the pledge
of allegiance, 52 the state has compelled expression in a way that is clearly
attributable to a particular person-the individual reciting the pledge.1
5
1
Conversely, if the government uses general tax revenues to fund its speech,
the state-compelled expression is not clearly attributable to any particular
taxpayer, because the connection between the message and the individual is
so attenuated. 5 4 Thus a traceability test asks whether a particular message
is reasonably attributable to a particular individual. 5  Such attribution is
relevant because, unless the government requires an individual to do some-
thing that reasonably links him to a message, it is difficult to describe what
the state has compelled as expression.'5 6
Traceability was an important issue for the Supreme Court in Rust v.
Sullivan. 57 In Rust, recipients of federal funding for a family planning
150. See Tomlinson, supra note 39, at 243 (stating that First Amendment may require
integrated bar to curtail its legislative program in order to protect dissenting members' freedom
of speech).
151. See Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1010-11 (discussing importance of identification of
particular speaker with particular message in compelled speech cases).
152. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding
unconstitutional state requirement that public school students participate in daily ceremonies
honoring United States flag). For further discussion of this case, see supra note 92.
153. Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1010.
154. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (noting .that government as representative of people may compel payment of taxes
for controversial projects); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 721 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (hypothesizing that state of New Hampshire could use tax revenues to erect and to
maintain billboards proclaiming motto, "Live Free or Die," without abridging First Amendment
rights of taxpayer opposed to motto); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1132 (3d Cir.
1989) (stating that nexus between government message that state funds with general tax
revenues and individual taxpayer is attenuated), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); Tomlinson,
supra note 39, at 246 (stating that compelled financial support of government agency does not
result in any impermissible identification or attribution of state's policies or views to taxpayer).
155. Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1011.
156. Id.
157. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
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clinic sued the Secretary of Health and Human Services.5 8 Under regulations
adopted in 1988,5 9 clinics receiving federal funds could not encourage
abortion, provide abortion counseling, or refer patients to abortion clinics.160
Although the regulations restricted recipients' freedom of speech, the Court
upheld the restrictions because they applied only to federally funded pro-
grams.16' At least one lower court had found that the regulations also limited
the availability of privately funded abortion counseling and services.' 62 The
Supreme Court, however, concluded that the regulations did not affect
abortion programs that were part of separate and distinct activities, such
as independent clinics that recipients might run with private money after
hours. 63 Furthermore, health-care facilities could avoid the restrictions
entirely by declining to accept federal funding.64
Read broadly, the Rust majority opinion would allow the government
to require the sacrifice of freedom of speech as a prerequisite to receipt of
a governmental benefit. 61 Such a reading of Rust raises troubling First
158. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1766 (1991).
159. 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8-.10 (1992).
160. Rust, II S. Ct. at 1765.
161. Id. at 1775.
162. See Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 70 (1st Cir.
1990) (stating that regulations at issue in Rust restricted private funds available for abortion
counseling and services), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252, overruled by
Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
163. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1774 (1991). But see Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 899 F.2d at 70 (stating that Rust regulations restricted privately funded abortion
services); New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that Rust regulations
required federally funded clinics to remain "physically and financially separate" from abortion
counseling programs), aff'd sub nom. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Moira T.
Roberts, Note, Individual Rights and Government Power in Collision: A Look at Rustt v.
Sullivan Through the Lens of Power Analysis, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1023, 1027 (1992)
(stating that Rust regulations effectively required clinics receiving federal grants to refrain from
using private funds to support abortion counseling).
164. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5.
165. See id. (stating that government does not compel recipient of federal funds to operate
with federal support; to avoid regulation, recipient could simply decline funding); David Cole,
Big Brother's New Weapon-Rust v. Sullivan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1992, at A13 (stating
that Rust reasoning would allow government to control content of speech it supported, because
speaker who objected to government control could avoid such control by declining government
support).
The idea that the government could condition grant of a benefit or privilege on the
surrender of freedom of speech is particularly problematic for lawyers, because the opportunity
to practice law is a privilege that a state bestows under conditions it selects. Lathrop v.
Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Wis. 1960) (quoting In re Greer, 81 P.2d 96, 98 (Ariz. 1938)),
aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); see also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 865 (1961) (Whittaker,
J., concurring) (calling practice of law special privilege); In re Rouss, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (N.Y.
1917) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that membership in bar is privilege burdened with conditions),
cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918). Therefore, under a broad reading of Rust, one might argue
that the First Amendment should not limit conditions on admission to the practice of law,
because a person who objected to those conditions could avoid them by declining the privilege
of becoming a lawyer. Cf. Rust, Il1 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5 (stating that recipient of federal funds
could avoid accompanying regulation by declining funding).
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Amendmenf questions'" and seems to conflict with prior Supreme Court
opinions.167 A narrow reading of Rust resolves this apparent conflict with
166. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that Rust majority
opinion disregards established principles of law and diminishes force of First Amendment);
SMOLLA, supra note 87, at 218 (stating that Rust decision was lamentable defeat for civil
liberties); Cole, supra note 165, at A13 (stating that Rust decision may have set stage for
government indoctrination of citizenry).
State action granting a privilege in exchange for the surrender of fundamental rights is
unconstitutional because the very words of the Constitution prohibit state action abridging
freedom of speech. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech); id. amend. XIV, § I (providing that no state shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law). This prohibition applies
regardless of whether the government bestows a privilege or benefit as some sort of compen-
sation for the abridgment of rights. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)
(rejecting broadly any limitation on First Amendment rights as condition on receipt of
government benefit); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that government
may not infringe upon liberty of expression by denying, or placing conditions upon, benefit
or privilege); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) (finding that state action
compelling surrender of constitutional right as condition of governmental favor could make
possible destruction of constitutional guarantees). To borrow an example from Justice Brennan,
whether the government fines a person a penny for being a Republican or withholds the grant
of a penny for the same reason, that state action infringes on the person's rights. Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359-60 n.13 (1976) (plurality opinion). To allow the state to give persons
governmental benefits in exchange for the surrender of certain rights would effectively penalize
the exercise of those freedoms; the government could thereby produce a result that it could
not command directly. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)). Such interference with First Amendment rights is unconstitutional. Id. Freedom of
speech would be an empty guarantee if the government were able to attach restrictions on
speech to any benefit that it bestowed. SMOU.A, supra note 87, at 182. Constitutional rights
are not so easy to barter away; the government may not offer a benefit or privilege in exchange
for. the surrender of liberty. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
167. See Owens ex rel. Israel S. v. Board of Educ., 601 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (IIl. App. Ct.
1992) (stating that Rust partially overruled Perry). In Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), the Supreme Court considered a teacher's First Amendment lawsuit against a Texas
junior college. Id. at 594-95. The teacher, Sindermann, had joined a group of students in
urging that the school become a four-year institution. Id. at 595. Sindermann's name appeared
in a newspaper advertisement that criticized the school's board of regents. Id. When the school
later declined to renew Sindermann's contract, he filed a lawsuit in federal court. Id.
Sindermann alleged that the college had based its decision not to rehire him on his public
comments; that decision, Sindermann claimed, violated his right to freedom of speech. Id. A
district court granted the college's motion for summary judgment, but the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939, 940 (5th Cir.
1970). The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit. Perry, 408 U.S. at 603.
The Perry Court broadly denounced any government action exacting a penalty, such as
the denial of certain benefits, for the exercise of certain First Amendment rights. Id. at 597;
see also supra note 166 (summarizing Perry holding). Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
noted that in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), the Court had found
constitutional protections applicable to a state-employed teacher's public criticism of his
superiors. Perry, 408 U.S. at 598. Relying on Pickering, the Court concluded that Sindermann
should have an opportunity to prove his constitutional claim. See id. (reversing summary
judgment against Sindermann).
Since the Perry decision, the Supreme Court on at least five occasions has refused to
allow the government to bestow a benefit on the condition that the recipient surrender First
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precedent. The Rust opinion upheld regulations that, in the majority's view,
constituted merely limitations of on-the-job speech by federally funded
health programs' employees . 6 This does not mean that the government
may restrict any speech it supports. 69 Rather, Rust states merely that the
government may restrict medical advice that it funds. 70 Confining Rust to
those facts is consistent with the government's broad role as a painstaking
regulator of health care. 171 The idea that the state may regulate medical
advice and treatment is hardly novel. 72
Amendment rights. In Elrod, a majority of the Court concluded that the government generally
could not deny a person the benefit of public employment simply because that person refused
to join a particular political party. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 353, 373 (concluding that dismissal
of government employee on partisan basis was unconstitutional); id. at 375 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (concluding that state may not compel nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential public
employee to join particular political party as condition of continued employment). In Branti
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Court restated the general rule from Elrod but issued a
new standard concerning exceptions to the ban on partisan firings. See id. at 518 (stating that
ultimate inquiry is not whether particular employee is in policymaking and confidential position,
but rather whether state can show that party affiliation is appropriate requirement for effective
performance of public office involved). Similarly, in Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62
(1990), the Court found that the First Amendment did not allow government to bestow
promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on public employees' political affiliations.
Id. at 75.
Additionally, in Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Court refused to allow
New Hampshire to deny the privilege of driving to residents who refused to display the state's
motto, "Live Free or Die," on their cars. Id. at 707, 717; see also supra notes 90-100 and
accompanying text (discussing Wooley opinion, hlding, and rationale). Finally, in FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court held that Congress could not
condition award of a federal grant on the surrender of a First Amendment right-freedom to
broadcast editorials. Id. at 366.
168. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1774 (1991); see also supra notes 158-64 and
accompanying text (discussing facts and holding in Rust). But see supra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text (noting view that Rust regulations effectively required clinics receiving
federal grants to refrain from abortion counseling even with private funds).
169. But see Cole, supra note 165, at A13 (suggesting that Rust reasoning could allow
Postal Service to deny mailing privileges to magazine that criticized government).
170. See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1774 (stating that Rust restrictions apply only to federally
funded programs and leave funding recipients free to perform otherwise restricted activities
through separate and independent programs).
171. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAmrF= CODE § 1205 (West 1990) (requiring license as
prerequisite to operation of health clinic); id. §§ 1225-1226 (instructing state agency to prom-
ulgate regulations prescribing kinds of services that clinics may provide and minimum standards
(1) of adequacy, safety, and sanitation of the physical plant and equipment, (2) for staffing
with duly qualified personnel, and (3) for providing services); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.003
(West 1993) (requiring persons who establish, conduct, or maintain hospitals to obtain licenses);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (concluding that state may regulate abortions by, inter
alia, licensing persons who and facilities that perform abortions); CHAYFT & SONNENREICH,
P.C., CERTIFCATE oF NEED: AN EXPANDING REGULATORY CONCEPT 1 (1978) (stating that
between 1965 and 1977, 36 states adopted laws requiring that persons wishing to construct or
modify certain health facilities first obtain permission from state agency).
172. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 827 (1975) (noting that state has
legitimate interest in maintaining quality of medical care within its borders); Barsky v. Board
of Regents of University of State of New York, 347 U.S; 442, 451 (1954) (stating that admission
1993] 1855
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1833
More importantly, a narrow reading of Rust comports with the Supreme
Court's earlier compelled speech decisions based on traceability.'7 Rust is
a traceability case because the speech at issue in Rust, at least in the
majority's view, was less the speech of private individuals than it was the
speech of a federally funded program. 74 The Rust restrictions, the Court
contended, applied only during working hours,' 7- so the personal speech of
grant recipients was beyond the reach of federal regulation. 76 Therefore,
the Court did not attribute the federally funded program's speech to its
individual employees, but merely to the program itself.
77
Another application of the traceability test appears in PruneYard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins.7 8 In PruneYard, the Supreme Court concluded that
a state could force a shopping center owner to allow protests by others on
his property.179 The owner, by opening his center's doors to shoppers, had
effectively invited the public onto his property.8 0 Therefore, the Court
reasoned, third parties would be unlikely to attribute demonstrators' speech
to the shopping center owner.' 8' In other words, a protestor's speech is the
speech of the protestor and is not traceable to the owner of property, open
to the public, that is the site of the protest. Indeed, the owner could
to practice of medicine is privilege that state grants under its substantially plenary power to
fix terms of admission); id. (finding that state's legitimate concern for maintaining high
standards of conduct within medical profession extends beyond initial licensing); Watson v.
Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (noting "well settled" proposition that state's police power
extends to regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly practice of medicine); Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (finding that state's power to provide for general
welfare authorizes state to regulate medical practitioners in order to protect people from
ignorance or deception); Tanya J. Dobash, Note, Physician-Patient Sexual Contact: The Battle
Between the State and the Medical Profession, 50 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1725, 1738-40 (1993)
(discussing state's authority to regulate practice of medicine).
173. Cf. infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text (discussing application of traceability
test in PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)); infra notes 213-35 and
accompanying text (discussing application of traceability test in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens
for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986), and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
174. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775 (1991) (stating that regulations at issue
in Rust govern solely scope of federally funded program and do not in any way restrict speech
of program employees acting as private individuals).
175. See id. (stating that regulations limit clinic employees' freedom of expression during
time that they actually work for federally funded project). But see supra notes 162-63 and
accompanying text (noting view that Rust regulations effectively required clinics receiving
federal grants to refrain from providing abortion counseling even with private funds).
176. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1775 (stating that Rust regulations do not restrict speech of clinic
employees acting as private individuals).
177. Id.
178. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
179. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (concluding that
California Supreme Court decision recognizing third party's right of access to shopping center
courtyard for speech purposes did not violate shopping center owner's property rights or First
Amendment rights).
180. Id. at 87.
181. Id.
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expressly disavow any connection with the protestors by posting signs
nearby.8 2
This traceability analysis is applicable to the issue of integrated bar
associations and compelled speech." If a bar's speech is reasonably attrib-
utable to a particular lawyer, state action compelling the lawyer to fund
the bar's speech infringes upon the lawyer's right to refrain from speaking.
1 4
Such attribution is appropriate, because it is reasonable to associate an
organization's views with a" dues-paying member of that organization.' A
private association, such as a bar, -represents only one segment of the
population. 8 6 Therefore, state-compelled support of such a private associ-
ation is fundamentally different from state-compelled support of govern-
ment, which represents all persons.'" The Constitution protects an individual's
right to withhold financial support for private associations.'88
182. Id.
183. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 858-59 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(applying traceability analysis to determine whether bar integration causes substantial infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights); Cantor, supra note 22, at 50 (same).
184. See Cantor, supra note 22, at 51 (stating that excessive lobbying by bar would make
compulsory bar dues inappropriate). One critic of a proposal to integrate the Massachusetts
Bar argued that
[i]ntegration is the floral or fuzzy word that means regimentation, collectivism,
institutionalism and power politics. It is a species from the great expanding genus
Totalitaria.... The leaders of the new union of the bar ... will publish their views
and proclaim them as the united voice of the great Bar of Massachusetts .... If
you don't pay [your dues] you are disbarred, not for dishonor but for dissent.
John E. Hannigan, In Opposition to Integration, MASS. L.Q., Oct. 1946, at 17-18.
185. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 259 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (stating that withholding financial support from private association is fully protected
as speech, because private association represents only one segment of population); United
States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1132 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that if government requires
publicly identified group to contribute to fund for dissemination of particular message asso-
ciated with group, government has directly focused its coercive power for expressive purposes),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1094 (1990); Petitioner's Opening Brief at 23, Keller v. State Bar, 496
U.S. 1 (1990) (No. 88-1905) (citing direct nexus between dissenting lawyer and California Bar's
promotion of certain causes); Walter Powers, Some Objections to Integration of the Bar in
Massachusetts, 27 B.U. L. REv. 118, 120 (1947) (stating that dissenting lawyers must sit by
while majority informs legislature, courts, and public that bar policies represent view of "the
lawyers"). But see Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 85.8-60 (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that
connection between individual lawyer and integrated bar's views is factually so remote that
compelled membership in bar is constitutional); Falk v. State Bar, 342 N.W.2d 504, 513 (Mich.
1983) (Boyle, J., concurring) (stating that reasonable persons are not likely to associate bar's
positions with particular lawyer merely because state forces lawyer to pay dues to bar in order
to practice law), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 925 (1984); In re Integration of
the Bar, 93 N.W.2d 601, 603 (Wis. 1958) (stating that policies of Wisconsin Bar are separate
and distinct from each individual member); Cantor, supra note 22, at 50 (stating that bar's
political positions are not attributable to individual lawyers).
186. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that Constitution
protects right to withhold financial support from private association, such as union, because
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Lawyers' financial and membership support for a bar's speech is unlike
the conduct of the PruneYard Shopping Center owner, whose property was
the site of a public protest but who did not have to sign a check paying
for the speech of the protestors." 9 The coercion lawyers face also is
distinguishable from the compulsion that the health-care workers faced in
Rust, because Rust concerned regulations that, at least in the Court's view,
limited only government-funded speech. 19 Lawyers in integrated-bar states,
on the other hand, must pay for the bar's speech.191 Because dissenting
lawyers must fund speech that they oppose, the compulsion they face is
different from the disinterested toleration of another's speech that the Court
saw and approved in Rust and PruneYard.
Dissenting lawyers also are unlike the shopping center owner in PruneYard
and the health care workers in Rust because, of the three, lawyers are least
able to distance themselves from views that they oppose. The PruneYard
Shopping Center owner could have posted signs disclaiming any support
for protestors using the center's property. 92 Similar signs could make clear
that a health-care facility is a government-funded clinic whose employees,
while on the job, speak for the clinic, not for themselves. 9 a Although
lawyers likewise have the option of speaking out against the bar's views,'9
dissenting lawyers clearly would face a far greater challenge in attempting
to tell everyone they know that they disagree with the bar's positions on
various issues. By simply stating that they are lawyers, attorneys in an
integrated-bar state are by definition associated with their state's bar.
95
Therefore, because a bar's speech is traceable to particular lawyers, attorneys
would seem to have a more compelling First Amendment complaint than
189. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980) (describing facts
that prompted shopping center owner's lawsuit).
190. See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1775 (1991) (stating that regulations at issue
in Rust govern scope of federally funded programs and do not restrict speech of program
employees acting as private individuals). But see supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text
(noting view that Rust regulations effectively required clinics receiving federal grants to refrain
from providing abortion counseling even with private funds).
191. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (noting that integrated bar is organization
that state requires lawyers to join and to support financially as condition of practicing law in
that state).
192. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 87; see also supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text
(discussing facts of PruneYard and possibility that shopping center owner could use signs to
disavow any support for protest at center).
193. See 42 C.F.R. § 59.9(d) (1992) (encouraging federal grant recipient to post signs and
other forms of identification of federally funded project); cf. Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776 (stating
that physician working at federally funded clinic is always free to make clear that advice
regarding abortion is simply beyond scope of government-funded program).
194. See In re Unification of N.H. Bar, 248 A.2d 709, 713 (N.H. 1968) (noting that
lawyer is free to voice own views on any subject in any manner, even if such views are
diametrically opposed to bar's position); Lathrop v. Donohue, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408 (Wis.
1960) (same), aff'd, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
195. See In re Unification of N.H. Bar, 248 A.2d at 711 (stating that integrated bar is
organization that state requires lawyers to join and to support financially as condition of
practicing law in that state).
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did the shopping center owner in PruneYard, who faced merely the tem-
porary inconvenience of having protestors among the visitors to his shopping
center, 196 or the health care workers in Rust, who the Court believed faced
merely the burden of having to refrain from speaking about certain topics
while on the job. 97
Furthermore, even if lawyers effectively could disavow any association
with an integrated bar's views, state action compelling lawyers to pay for
the bar's speech remains an injury to their right to refrain from speaking. 19s
Disavowal might remedy harm that a bar caused to a lawyer's reputation,
but it would not prevent infringenent upon the lawyer's right to remain
silent. 99 Because of the state's compulsion, dissenting lawyers must suffer
reputational harm or must speak out to prevent such harm. 2°° Either way,
such lawyers have effectively lost control over how to present themselves
to the world. 20'
Finally, regardless of whether others actually associate the bar's speech
with a particular lawyer, state action compelling a lawyer to support speech
that the lawyer opposes violates the lawyer's freedom of conscience. 20 2 The
Supreme Court recognized and protected the individual's interest in freedom
.of conscience in Wooley v. Maynard03 and in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette.2°4 In Wooley, the Supreme Court held that a New
196. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 77 (1980). For further discussion
of PruneYard, see supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
197. Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. 1759, 1775 (1991). For further discussion of Rust, see
supra notes 157-77 and accompanying text.
198. See Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1007 (stating that government compulsion of expression
deprives individual of opportunity to refrain from speaking).
199. See id. at 1010-11 (noting that state action compelling expression infringes upon First
Amendment interests by forcing individual to speak when individual might have preferred to
remain silent); cf. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 99 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that mere fact
that property owner is free to dissociate himself from views expressed on his property cannot
restore his right to refrain from speaking in first place).
200. Cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 15 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (criticizing state agency's attempt to compel utility to publish third party's messages
in utility's newsletter because, inter alia, order would force utility to appear to agree with
third party's views or to disclaim those views); PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 99 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (indicating that state could not compel business to allow public to post items on
business's bulletin board, because such compulsion would force business to appear to agree
with posted material or to disclaim that material).
201. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 874 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating
that interest at stake in First Amendment challenge to integration of Wisconsin Bar was interest
of individual lawyers in having full freedom to think their own thoughts, speak their own
minds, support their own causes, and wholeheartedly fight whatever ideas they oppose);
Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1005 (noting that state action depriving individual of right to
remain silent denies that individual freedom to decide how to present himself to world).
202. See Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1012 (noting that state action compelling individual
to affirm belief that individual opposes violates individual's freedom of conscience regardless
of whether compliance would communicate message to others).
203. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). For further discussion of Wooley, see supra notes 90-100 and
accompanying text.
204. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). For further discussion of Barnette, see supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
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Hampshire statute requiring car owners to carry the state's motto on their
cars unconstitutionally compelled speech, 205 even though it seems unlikely
that others would regard a particular car owner's compliance with the state's
demand as affirmation of the state's motto.? Likewise, in Barnette, the
Supreme Court held that a school board resolution requiring students to
participate in the pledge of allegiance unconstitutionally.compelled speech,
207
even though it seems unlikely that others would regard a particular student's
compliance with the state's demand as affirmation of the state's beliefs.m
In neither case did the Court's decision turn on how others would assess
the individual's actions.209 Instead, the crucial inquiry was whether the
individual reasonably might regard compliance with the state's command as
affirmation of some belief that the individual opposed. 210 Similarly, even if
no one but a single lawyer realizes that bar dues support speech that the
lawyer finds- anathema, the individual lawyer reasonably could view what
the state requires as an affirmation of belief, because the lawyer's money
directly supports the bar's speech. 21' In other words, the lawyer himself
would trace the bar's speech to himself.2 2 Therefore, no matter how others
interpret the lawyer's actions, a state requirement that all lawyers pay for
bar speech that a particular lawyer opposes violates the dissenting lawyer's
freedom of conscience.
C. When Groups Talk, Who is Talking?
Two recent Supreme Court opinions further illustrate the Court's trace-
ability analysis and, because they involve organizations' speech, are partic-
ularly relevant to the issue of integrated bars. In both FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc. ,213 and Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Com-
205. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
206. See Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1011-12 (noting that others probably would not regard
compliance with license plate requirement as expression of car owner's views, because state
required virtually everyone to display similar license plates).
207. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
208. See Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1012 (noting that others probably would not regard
participation in pledge of allegiance as expression of individual student's views, because state
required all students to participate in pledge).
209. See id. (discussing Wooley and Barnette before concluding that crucial inquiry in
determining whether state action infringes upon freedom of conscience is not whether compli-
ance would in fact communicate message to others).
210. Id.; cf. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992) (stating that reasonable
dissenter in school graduation ceremony could believe that attendance signified dissenter's
participation in or approval of prayer that was part of ceremony).
211. See Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1, 5 (1990) (stating that Keller plaintiffs challenged
bar expenditures that advanced political and ideological causes that plaintiffs opposed); cf.
Gaebler, supra note 87, at 1022 (stating that individual union member might regard payment
of dues as general endorsement of union).
212. See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 23, Keller v. State Bar, 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (No. 88-
1905) (citing direct nexus between dissenting lawyer and causes promoted by California Bar);
Powers, supra note 185, at 120 (stating that dissenting lawyers must sit by while majority
informs legislature, courts, and public that bar policies represent view of "the lawyers").
213. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
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merce,214 the Court found that an organization's speech was reasonably
traceable to the organization's supporters. 2 5 The remaining question for the
Court, then, was whether the group's speech reflected the intentions of
those supporters.
21 6
In the first of these cases, Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court
refused to allow enforcement of a federal statute 17 banning the expenditure
of corporate funds for political purposes.218 The statute allowed corporations
to make political expenditures from segregated funds, but not from cor-
porate treasuries. 2 9 The Court reasoned that Massachusetts Citizens for Life
(MCFL) was more like a voluntary political association than a traditional
corporation 20 Consequently, donors would be fully aware of MCFL's
political purposes and would contribute precisely because they support those
purposes.221 In other words, the Court found that MCFL's speech was
traceable to its donors,2 and that because MCFL was a clearly political
organization, this traceability was consistent with the donors' intentions. 3
MCFL's speech, paid for by donors, was almost certainly speech that the
donors intended to support. The Court therefore concluded that MCFL's
speech, as a clear 'reflection of donors' intentions, was subject to First
Amendment protections that rendered the restrictions at issue unconstitu-
tional.21A
214. 494 U.S. 652 (1989).
215. See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990)
(stating that Chamber's general treasury, which included money that Chamber collected from
all members through annual dues, was source of funds that Chamber used to purchase political
advertisement); id. at 670 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that stockholder funds are ultimate
source of expenditures from corporation's general treasury in support of particular political
candidate); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1986) (noting
that donors contribute funds to Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) in order to support
group's political purposes and generally share those purposes with organization); id. at 242
(noting that MCFL's members were persons who contributed to organization or indicated
support for its activities).
216. See Austin, 494 U.S. at 663 (discussing intent of Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce members); Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 260-61 (discussing intent
of MCFL donors).
217. Federal Election Campaign Act § 316, 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (1988).
218. See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 241 (holding that statute prohibiting
corporation's use of treasury funds for political purposes was unconstitutional as applied).
219. Id.
220. See id. (noting that MCFL's articles of incorporation stated that group's purpose
was to foster respect for human life through educational and political activities); SMOLLA,
supra note 87, at 227 (stating that MCFL had features more akin to voluntary political
associations than business firms).
221. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260-61 (1986).
222. Id.; see also id. at 242 (noting that MCFL's members were persons who contributed
to organization or indicated support for its activities).
223. See id. at 261 (noting shared political purposes of political organizations, such as
MCFL, and contributors).
224. Id. at 263-65.
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The Court's reasoning in Massachusetts Citizens for Life is comparable
to the analysis in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,2 a
more recent Supreme Court case concerning traceability and an organiza-
tion's speech. 2 6 In Austin, the Court upheld a state statutez27 banning the
expenditure of funds from a corporation's treasury for political purposes.?8
Under this statute, the Chamber could not expend members' annual dues
for political purposes229 but could use separate funds to pay for the Cham-
ber's political programs. 2 0 The Court reasoned that burdening the Cham-
ber's speech was appropriate, in part because members might disagree with
the group's political expression yet continue to pay dues in order to benefit
from the Chamber's nonpolitical programs. 23' Because the Chamber, unlike
MCFL, was not a clearly political organization, persons who joined the
Chamber did not necessarily authorize the use of their dues for the Cham-
ber's political ends.232 In other words, the Court found that the Chamber's
speech was traceable to Chamber members,233 but that this traceability was
potentially inconsistent with members' intentions .2 4 The Chamber's speech,
although paid for by members, was not necessarily speech that the members
intended to support. The Court therefore concluded that Michigan's statute
limiting the Chamber's use of members' dues was not violative of the First
Amendment.
25
The Massachusetts Citizens for Life and Austin approach to traceability
and group expenditures, although developed in response to statutory limi-
tations on group speech, is applicable in the integrated bar context. Because
state action compels lawyers to support an integrated bar's speech, the
225. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1989).
226. See SMOLLA, supra note 87, at 230 (comparing Massachusetts Citizens for Life and
Austin and stating that Austin Court found Chamber's purposes were unlike those of MCFL).
227. Michigan Campaign Finance Act § 54(1), MIcH. COMp. LAws § 169.254-.255 (1989).
228. Austin, 494 U.S. at 655.
229. See id. at 656 (stating that Chamber's proposed use of general funds to purchase
newspaper advertisement in support of political candidate would constitute felony).
230. See id. at 655 (stating that Michigan statute exempted any expenditure that corpo-
rations made from segregated funds from ban on corporate political spending).
231. Id. at 663.
232. See id. (stating that Chambet's political agenda is sufficiently distinct from its
educational and outreach programs that members who disagree with former may continue to
pay dues to participate in latter); cf. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238, 260 (1986) (stating that stockholder or union member, who contributes investment funds
or union dues for economic gain, does not necessarily authorize use of that money for political
ends).
233. See Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990)
(stating that Chamber's general treasury, which included money that Chamber collected from
all members through annual dues, was source of funds that Chamber used to purchase political
advertisement); id. at 670 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that stockholder funds are ultimate
source of expenditures from corporation's general treasury in support of particular political
candidate).
234. See id. at 663 (stating that Chamber's political agenda is sufficiently distinct from
its educational and outreach programs that members who disagree with former may continue
to pay dues to participate in latter).
235. Id. at 666.
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federal judiciary has a duty to protect lawyers from such state action if it
conflicts with the First Amendment. 236 Lawyers in states with integrated
bars, in order to remain lawyers, must pay bar dues whether or not they
support the bar's speech 37 MCFL's contributors faced no such compulsion,
because donors to that organization who became dissatisfied with MCFL's
expenditures could simply stop contributing.2 8 Lawyers, however, like mem-
bers of the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, might "disagree with
the [bar's] political expression" yet continue to pay dues "because they
wish to benefit from the [bar's] non-political programs," particularly its
legislated monopoly on the practice of law.239 Because integrated-bar states
demand that lawyers maintain membership in state bars in order to practice
law, it is unconstitutional for states or integrated bars to tell lawyers that
they may alleviate any unhappiness concerning the bar's use of their money
simply by leaving the organization.m Therefore, under Austin, the Supreme
Court would say to an integrated bar: In order to spend a member's money
on speech, you must be able to show that the member has appointed you
his agent for speaking purposes.2' Because lawyers in integrated bar states,
like members of the Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, pay bar dues
for reasons other than to support bars' speech, integrated bars would have
236. Cf. id. at 675 (Brennan, J., concurring) (indicating that state action triggers consti-
tutional duty to protect objecting Chamber member or corporate shareholder from use of
member's dues or shareholder's invested funds for political purposes).
237. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6125 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993) (stating that
only active members of California Bar may practice law in state); id. § 6126 (stating that
holding oneself out as entitled to practice law while suspended from state bar is criminal act);
id. § 6143 (requiring suspension from membership in state bar of any member who fails to
pay membership fee); In re Unified Bar, 530 P.2d 765, 765, 768 (Mont. 1975) (adopting as
part of state bar's constitution provision that nonpayment of bar association dues and
assessments shall result in suspension of right to practice law); In re Chapman, 509 A.2d 753,
756 (N.H. 1986) (stating that lawyer is not at liberty to resign from unified bar, because by
doing so lawyer loses privilege to practice law).
238. See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 261 (1986) (stating
that contributor dissatisfied with MCFL's use of donated funds could simply stop contributing).
239. Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 663 (1990).
240. Cf. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 260 (stating that because stockholder
or union member depends on corporation or union for income or job, it is not enough to tell
stockholder or union member to remedy any unhappiness concerning group's expenditures
simply by leaving corporation or union); supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing
rule from Supreme Court cases denying government power to bestow privilege in exchange for
surrender of constitutional rights).
241. Cf. SMOLLA, supra note 87, at 228-39 (finding that Massachusetts Citizens for Life
and Austin limit organizational speech on basis of members' or donors' intent). Smolla reads
Massachusetts Citizens for Life and Austin as announcing the following rule for organizations
that engage in speech:
[I]f money is to talk, it must talk for itself. You can spend all you want of your
own money on political speech, but not other people's money. In order to spend
the money of others on political speech, you must be able to show that they have
appointed you their agent for speaking purposes. The power of the money in the
pot must reflect the power of the ideas of those who pay into it.
Id. at 237.
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to fund their speech with money donated for speech purposes, not with
revenues derived from mandatory dues. 242 Funds that a state compels lawyers
to pay to a bar could be spent solely for the bar's nonspeech purpose-
regulation of the legal profession.
24 3
IV. CONCLUSION
By declining to apply a traceability analysis and instead allowing inte-
grated bars to spend mandatory dues on nonregulatory programs, the
Supreme Court in Keller created more confusion than clarity.2 To end this
disarray and to protect lawyers' First Amendment rights, the Court should
look to the traceability analysis it has developed in other free speech cases
and should apply that standard in the integrated-bar context.2 4 5 Because a
bar's political speech is attributable to its members,24 the result of a
traceability analysis in the bar association setting would be strict limits on
expenditures of compulsory dues and respect for lawyers' rights to refrain
from speaking. 247 Bars no longer would be able to use the police power of
the state to coerce support for their political agendas. Bars would remain
free, however, to ask member-lawyers to support political speech.24 Clients
would know that hiring a lawyer need not amount to an indirect contribution
to the bar's ideological causes. Finally, lawyers would know that bars would
spend mandatory dues to regulate the profession and not to advance political
agendas that individual lawyers might oppose.
JAmEs B. LAKE
242. Id.; see also Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1570 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating
that bar may speak on any issue as long as it does so without using compulsory dues of
dissenting members).
243. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (advocating strict limits on bar
expenditures of mandatory dues).
244. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (discussing bars' difficulty in applying
Keller standard).
245. See supra notes 151-243 and accompanying text (explaining constitutional significance
of traceability and assessing traceability of bar's speech to individual lawyers).
246. See supra notes 183-243 and accompanying text (applying traceability analysis to
situation that lawyers face in states with integrated bars).
247. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text (advocating that bars expend funds
derived from compulsory dues solely to regulate profession).
248. See Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1570 (lth Cir. 1986) (stating that bar
may speak on any issue as long as it does so without using compulsory dues of dissenting
members).
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